Central African Republic News Gazette

Madrid, Real Madrid moved a step closer to the LaLiga title after easing past city rivals Getafe 2-0 thanks to goals from Casemiro and Lucas Vazquez.

With seven games left, Real extended their lead atop the standings to 12 points over Sevilla and 15 clear of Barcelona, who have two games in hand and face second-bottom Levante on Sunday.

Casemiro opened the scoring after 38 minutes, diving to head home a brilliant outside of the boot cross from Vinicius Jr.

The young Brazilian winger was once again instrumental for Real Madrid, a constant threat to Getafe’s defence who created most of his teams chances from the left flank, Reuters reports.

Totally in control, Real extended their lead in the second half as Vazquez finished coolly with a precise cross-shot after a nice exchange of passes with Rodrygo.

Getafe, who are four points away from the relegation zone and have only won two of their last eight league games, managed no shots on target.

“It wasn’t easy, we made it look easy,” Real Madrid captain Marcelo told Movistar Plus.

The experienced defender was one of several squad players who started as coach Carlo Ancelotti rotated his squad ahead of the Champions League quarter-final second leg against Chelsea on Tuesday.

“We ran a lot and played hard until the end,” Marcelo said.

“Everyone in the locker room needs to feel important, it was nice to see some of us who don’t have many minutes to enjoy themselves in front of our fans. We all have to be ready if needed at the end of the season.”

One player who did not get a warm reception was Welsh forward Gareth Bale, who came off the bench in the 74th minute to loud booing from the Real Madrid fans for his first appearance at Santiago Bernabeu in more than two years.

“It’s hard, it happened to many players in this club,” Marcelo said.

“Fans need to understand that we are all important. We are at the end of the season, we have a lot at stake, we have to help each other, our team mates. We are with him.”

Source: Bahrain News Agency

Manchester, Manchester United forward Cristiano Ronaldo has apologised after he appeared to knock a mobile phone out of a supporter’s hand following his side’s 1-0 defeat at Everton on Saturday.

Footage emerged on social media of Ronaldo appearing to swipe his hand towards the ground as he walked off the pitch and headed for the tunnel at Goodison Park. Eyewitnesses said the 37-year-old had knocked a fan’s phone out of their hand and it smashed to the ground, Reuters reports.

Ronaldo took to Instagram to apologise for the incident.

“It’s never easy to deal with emotions in difficult moments such as the one we are facing,” Ronaldo said. “Nevertheless, we always have to be respectful, patient and set the example for all the youngsters who love the beautiful game.

“I would like to apologise for my outburst and, if possible, I would like to invite this supporter to watch a game at Old Trafford as a sign of fair-play and sportsmanship.”

The club have told Reuters they are looking into the incident.

The defeat left United seventh in the Premier League standings and they face the prospect of missing out on qualification for next season’s Champions League as they are six points adrift of fourth-placed Tottenham Hotspur.

Source: Bahrain News Agency

Executive Summary

1. Market structure, trade profiles and recent price trends

1.1 Market shares

• The Russian Federation and Ukraine are among the most important producers of agricultural commodities in the world. Both countries are net exporters of agricultural products, and they both play leading supply roles in global markets of foodstuffs and fertilisers, where exportable supplies are often concentrated in a handful of countries. This concentration could expose these markets to increased vulnerability to shocks and volatility.

• In 2021, either the Russian Federation or Ukraine (or both) ranked amongst the top three global exporters of wheat, maize, rapeseed, sunflower seeds and sunflower oil, while the Russian Federation also stood as the world’s top exporter of nitrogen fertilizers, the second leading supplier of potassium fertilizers and the third largest exporter of phosphorous fertilizers.

1.2 Trade profiles

• Many countries that are highly dependent on imported foodstuffs and fertilizers, including numerous that fall into the Least Developed Country (LDC) and Low-Income Food-Deficit Country (LIFDC) groups, rely on Ukrainian and Russian food supplies to meet their consumption needs. Many of these countries, already prior to the conflict, had been grappling with the negative effects of high international food and fertilizer prices.

1. Risk analysis: Assessing the risks emanating from the conflict

2.1 Trade risks

• In Ukraine, the escalation of the conflict raises concerns on whether crops will be harvested and products exported. The war has already led to port closures, the suspension of oilseed crushing operations and the introduction of export licensing requirements for some products. All of these could take a toll on the country’s exports of grains and vegetable oils in the months ahead. Much uncertainty also surrounds Russian export prospects, given sales difficulties that may arise as a result of economic sanctions imposed on the country.

2.2 Price risks

• FAO’s simulations gauging the potential impacts of a sudden and steep reduction in grain and sunflower seed exports by the two countries indicate that these shortfalls might only be partially compensated by alternative sources during the 2022/23 marketing season. The capacity of many exporting countries to boost output and shipments may be limited by high production and input costs. Worryingly, the resulting global supply gap could raise international food and feed prices by 8 to 22 percent above their already elevated baseline levels.

• If the conflict keeps crude oil prices at high levels and prolongs the two countries’ reduced global export participation beyond the 2022/23 season, a considerable supply gap would remain in global grain and sunflowerseed markets, even as alternative producing countries expand their output in response to the higher output prices. This would keep international prices elevated well above baseline levels.

2.3 Logistical risks

• In Ukraine, there are also concerns that the conflict may result in damages to inland transport infrastructure and seaports, as well as storage and processing infrastructure. This is all the more so given the limited capacity of alternatives, such as rail transport for seaports or smaller processing facilities for modern oilseeds crushing facilities, to compensate for their lack of operation.

• More generally, apprehensions also exist regarding increasing insurance premia for vessels destined to berth in the Black Sea region, as these could exacerbate the already elevated costs of maritime transportation, compounding further the effects on the final costs of internationally sourced food paid by importers.

2.4 Production risks

• Although early production prospects for 2022/23 winter crops were favourable in both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, in Ukraine, the conflict may prevent farmers from attending to their fields and harvesting and marketing their crops, while disruptions to essential public services could also negatively affect agricultural activities.

• Current indications are that, as a result of the conflict, between 20 and 30 percent of areas sown to winter crops in Ukraine will remain unharvested during the 2022/23 season, with the yields of these crops also likely to be adversely affected. Furthermore, considerable uncertainties surround Ukrainian farmers’ capacity to plant crops during the fast approaching spring crop cycle.

• The conflict is also likely to affect the ability of Ukraine to control its animal disease burden, significantly increasing the risk of proliferation of animal diseases, notably of African swine fever (ASF), within Ukraine and in neighbouring countries.

• In the case of the Russian Federation, although no major disruption to crops already in the ground appears imminent, uncertainties exist over the impact that the international sanctions imposed on the country will have on food exports. Any loss of export markets could depress farmer incomes, thereby negatively affecting future planting decisions.

• Economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation could also disrupt its imports of agricultural inputs, notably pesticides and seeds, on which the country is highly dependent. This could result in less plantings, lower yields and lower qualities, exposing the Russian agricultural sector and global food supplies, at large, to non-negligible risks.

2.5 Humanitarian risks

• The conflict is set to increase humanitarian needs in Ukraine, while deepening those of millions of people that prior to its escalation were already displaced or requiring assistance due to the more than eight-year conflict in the eastern part of the country. By directly constraining agricultural production, limiting economic activity and raising prices, the conflict will further undercut the purchasing power of local populations, with consequent increases in food insecurity and malnutrition.

• Humanitarian needs in neighbouring countries, where displaced populations are seeking refuge, are also set to increase substantially.

• Globally, if the conflict results in a sudden and prolonged reduction in food exports by Ukraine and the Russian Federation, it will exert additional upward pressure on international food commodity prices to the detriment of economically vulnerable countries, in particular. FAO’s simulations suggest that under such a scenario, the global number of undernourished people could increase by 8 to 13 million people in 2022/23, with the most pronounced increases taking place in Asia-Pacific, followed by sub-Saharan Africa, and the Near East and North Africa. If the war lasts, impacts will go well beyond 2022/23.

2.6 Energy risks

• The Russian Federation is a key player in the global energy market. As a highly energy-intensive industry, especially in developed regions, agriculture will inevitably be affected by the sharp increase in energy prices that has accompanied the conflict.

• Agriculture absorbs high amounts of energy directly, through the use of fuel, gas and electricity, and indirectly, through the use of agri-chemicals such as fertilisers, pesticides and lubricants.

• With prices of fertilizers and other energy-intensive products rising as a consequence of the conflict, overall input prices are expected to experience a considerable boost. The higher prices of these inputs will first translate into higher production costs and eventually into higher food prices. They could also lead to lower input use levels, depressing yields and harvests in the 2022/23 season, thus giving further upside risk to the state of global food security in the coming years.

• Higher energy prices also make agricultural feedstocks (especially maize, sugar and oilseeds/vegetable oils) competitive for the production of bio-energy and, given the large size of the energy market relative to the food market, this could pull food prices up to their energy parity equivalents.

2.7 Exchange rate, debt, and growth risks

• The Ukrainian hryvnia reached a record low against the United States dollar (USD) in early March 2022, with likely repercussions for Ukrainian agriculture, including a boost to its export competitiveness and curbs on its ability to import.

• Although their extent remains unclear at this stage, conflict-induced damages to Ukraine’s productive capacity and infrastructure are expected to entail very high recovery and reconstruction costs.

• The economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation have also led to a significant depreciation of the Russian rouble. Although this should make Russian exports of agricultural commodities more affordable, a lasting rouble depreciation would negatively affect investment and productivity growth prospects in the country.

• Weakening economic activity and a depreciated rouble are also expected to have serious effects on countries in Central Asia through the reduction of remittance flows, as for many of these countries remittances constitute a significant part of gross domestic product (GDP).

• The current conflict may also have global spillovers. While its impact on the global economy remains uncertain at this stage and will depend on several factors, the most vulnerable countries and populations are expected to be hit hard by slower economic growth and increased inflation, at a time when the world is still attempting to recover from the recession triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic.

• Agriculture is the backbone of the economies of many developing countries, the majority of which rely on the United States dollar for their borrowing needs. As such, a lasting appreciation of the USD vis-à-vis other currencies may have negative significant economic consequences for these countries, including for their agrifood sectors. Moreover, the potential reduction of GDP growth in several parts of the world will affect global demand for agrifood products with negative consequences for global food security. Lower GDP growth will also likely reduce the availability of funds for development, especially if global military expenses increase.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Cameroon

A quick update from Cameroon, where our team there, led by the Resident Coordinator, Matthias Naab, continues to support the authorities’ efforts to address the pandemic and other challenges.

On the health front, we helped the Government increase the budget allocation to the COVID-19 response and its socioeconomic impact from $250 million to $332 million last year.

Our team also supported COVID-19 vaccinations at 244 locations across the country, with three national vaccination campaigns having been held so far.

To date, more than 1.5 million COVID-19 vaccines have arrived in Cameroon through COVAX, with more than 1.3 million people having received at least one dose and over a million people having been fully vaccinated.

We have worked with authorities to communicate to 200,000 young people who are both in and out of school on the prevention of HIV/AIDS. Our team has helped to train more than 100 health-care workers in emergency obstetric care and on managing newborn and child illnesses.

Our team has also boosted the Government’s capacity to provide online primary education services to schools nationwide. More than 320,000 students and more than 8,000 head teachers now have access to online teaching.

Source: UN Department of Global Communications

Without Adaptation, Middle East and Central Asia Face Crippling Climate Losses

By Jihad Azour and Christoph Duenwald

International cooperation is essential to manage the costs and maximize the benefits of adaptation, particularly for the most vulnerable countries.

Climate change is inflicting crippling losses in the Middle East and Central Asia, with poor and conflict-affected countries suffering the most from higher temperatures and extreme weather events.

In any given year since 2000, climate disasters have killed more than 2,600 people, affected 7 million others, and caused $2 billion in direct material damage.

A new IMF staff paper assesses the economic impact of climate change in the region and shows how adaptation policies have become a pressing priority. It underscores the need for international support to finance adaptation.

According to our analysis, climate disasters in the region reduce annual economic growth by 1-2 percentage points on a per capita basis. And these events are expected to become more common and more severe as the planet heats up.

Over the past three decades, temperatures in the region have risen by 1.5 degrees Celsius—twice the global increase of 0.7 degrees Celsius. This has been particularly harmful for countries that are already hot.

A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius in five of the hottest countries (Bahrain, Djibouti, Mauritania, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) results in an immediate decline in per capita economic growth of around 2 percentage points.

In addition, much of the region lies in harsh climate zones, where global warming is exacerbating desertification, water stress, and rising seas. Rainfall has become more variable and climate disasters such as droughts and floods more frequent. Lives and livelihoods are at risk.

In Tunisia, for instance, 90 percent of tourism is located along coasts that are threatened by erosion and vulnerable to further rises in the sea levels. And in Iran, a severe drought last year sparked protests as water shortages forced farmers out of work.

Climate change has high human, economic costs

Countries with low climate resilience, including fragile and conflict-affected states such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as Pakistan, a lower-middle income country, captured by both exposure and vulnerability to climate hazards, have suffered intensely with more people killed or affected.

Many people in these countries live off rain-fed subsistence farming, which is especially vulnerable to climate shocks. The challenge is compounded by political and macroeconomic instability, low socioeconomic and financial development, and risks to food and social security.

Countries with stronger institutions and climate-resilient infrastructure, for example heat-resistant buildings or efficient irrigation systems, have generally experienced lower human losses. The same is true for those with higher levels of socioeconomic and human development, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

Despite global efforts to curb carbon emissions, further intensification of climate stresses seems inevitable. By 2050, average summertime temperatures could exceed 30 degrees Celsius in half the region’s countries.

Seasons are also likely to become drier in the Middle East and North Africa, and rainfall patchier in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Pakistan, making droughts more likely. In Tajikistan, the annual probability of climate-induced droughts could rise tenfold from 3 percent today to more than 30 percent by the end of this century.

Pressing priority

Most countries now recognize that climate adaptation is a pressing priority and have started to address climate challenges. Priority should be given to measures that are highly beneficial under all plausible climate-change scenarios (so-called “high-value, no-regret measures”) and building capacity to adapt to future climate challenges.

Tunisia, for instance, has expanded its capacity to produce freshwater from desalination. Pakistan has strengthened its social safety net by scaling up targeted cash transfers. And Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have upgraded cross-border early warning systems for natural disasters.

There is no single one-size-fits-all solution because each country faces its own set of challenges, but some common principles apply to the whole region.

As the IMF’s Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva stressed recently at the World Government Summit in Dubai, adaptation policies should be brought into the mainstream of all national economic strategies. Macroeconomic frameworks that reflect climate risks should be developed to determine the right policy responses.

In addition, specific interventions could focus on boosting public investment in resilient infrastructure, encouraging a greater role for the private sector in adaptation, and adjusting inclusive growth and development agendas to reflect climate risks, for example by supporting businesses that are suffering from climate change and strengthening social protection for vulnerable households.

Simulations for Morocco show that investment in water infrastructure would improve resilience to droughts, reducing GDP losses by almost 60 percent and capping the rise in public debt.

For lower-income, fragile and conflict-affected countries, which have suffered heavy losses historically, the immediate priority should be strengthening disaster preparedness, while improving the capacity of institutions to address climate change and the ability of communities to respond to shocks.

Stepping up adaptation efforts will require significant additional spending and, therefore, financing.

International support

Tapping additional domestic revenue can play an important part in supporting spending on climate adaptation while reducing any increase in public debt. But countries also require greater international support to finance adaptation, ideally on concessional terms, as well as transfers of expertise and technology to develop their own capacity to adapt to climate change.

Between 2009 and 2019, bilateral and multilateral organizations provided around $70 billion in climate finance to the region, according to our calculations, based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. However, a large proportion was for mitigation initiatives and only around a quarter solely for adaptation. Estimated adaptation needs are much greater.

The COP27 summit in Egypt later this year offers an opportunity for the international community to scale up its climate finance contributions and support adaptation in developing economies.

Strengthening capacity to adapt to climate change is critical for the Middle East and Central Asia and should be pursued in tandem with global mitigation and transition efforts. For countries that adapt in time, there are opportunities to create jobs that are sustainable and support economic recovery and resilience after the pandemic.

The IMF is supporting its member countries in these efforts with policy advice, capacity development, and lending. A proposed Resilience and Sustainability Trust will further support reforms that increase countries’ resilience to climate change.

Source: International Monetary Fund